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The conventional way of analyzing abortion and religion presumes that 
abortion rights are the normative baseline grounded in constitutionalism, rationality, 
scientific fact, and non-discrimination.1 Religion, to the degree that it contradicts 
that normative baseline, is implicitly the opposite: aberrant, constitutionally suspect, 
harmful, irrational, unscientific, and discriminatory.2 Once the matter is framed that 
 
* Harwell G. Davis Professor of Constitutional Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford  
University. The author thanks Claire Horner for her review of and comments on a prior draft of this 
article, and Emma Cummings for her excellent research assistance. 
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice, 95  
TEX. L. REV. 1189 (2017); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and 
the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 107 (1982); Justin Buckley Dyer, The Constitution, Congress 
and Abortion, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 394 (2017); Huseina Sulaimanee, Note, Protecting the Right to 
Choose: Regulating Conscience Clauses in the Face of Moral Obligation, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 417, 
419 (2011) (“This Note argues that provider conscience clauses for abortion services not only deny 
women a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, but they also violate informed 
consent principles and the separation of church and state set out in the Establishment Clause.”). 
2. See PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN 
MEDICINE (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1111 (2016); Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan, Constitutional Exceptionalism, 2016 
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way, the question of whether to grant religious liberty exceptions to the normative 
baseline is problematic. To the degree such exceptions are allowed, the 
constitutionally-based normative baseline has been breached. Rationality has given 
way to irrationality, science to superstition, equality to discrimination, protection to 
harm. 
Of course, these presumptions are usually implicit rather than explicit. But it 
is these structures of thought, these presuppositions behind the analysis, that have 
been formative. 
This article turns these presumptions on their head. Upon examination, the 
abortion liberty is based on the raw assertion of judicial power without resort or 
regard to reason. Rather than being a right grounded in science, the abortion right 
has obscured and confused the relevant science. It is religious liberty, rather than 
the abortion liberty, that should define the constitutional baseline, given the explicit 
protection of religious freedom in the First Amendment and the lack of any 
equivalent textual, structural, or historical support for the abortion liberty.3 The 
abortion right movement is profoundly discriminatory, denying the unborn, even at 
nine months of pregnancy, the right to recognition as a person before the law,4 
while seeking to discriminate against religious persons and organizations who object 
to participating in abortion. Further, upon examination it is the abortion rights 
movement that has little interest or respect for the conscience and viewpoints of 
women in regard to abortion. The abortion liberty, in turning the woman against 
her offspring, protects neither and harms both. It is the abortion liberty that is the 
aberration in relationship to our society’s fundamental values and norms. 
Thus, religion’s role in regard to abortion is primarily that of calling society to 
apply to the abortion issue society’s own values of rationality, respect for human 
dignity, constitutionalism, democratic governance, science, and non-discrimination. 
Further, resistance to the abortion right is grounded not in idiosyncratic religious 
dogma or irrational belief, but in presuppositions shared broadly in American 
society. Hence, religion and religious organizations involved in anti-abortion 
activism are not seeking an aberrant exception to society’s norms, but rather are 
participants in a broader movement founded in the most fundamental norms of our 
society. 
 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1287, 1329 (2016); Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: 
Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015); Sarah M. Stephens, The Search for 
Authenticity and Manipulation of Tradition: Restrictions on Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United 
States and Egypt, 19 CARDOZO J.L & GENDER 325, 327 (2013). On the problem of competing 
“rationalities,” see ALALDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). On the 
debate over whether religion is intrinsically irrational, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom 
Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043 (2014), reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 
(2013). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
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I. RAW JUDICIAL POWER WITHOUT RECOURSE TO REASON 
The abortion rights movement has generally relied on the Supreme Court’s 
abortion decisions for legitimation of the abortion rights position, while at the same 
time often seeking, literally or in effect, to rewrite those decisions in order to make 
them more persuasive.5 Abortion rights organizations reflexively defend Roe v. 
Wade6 as foundational and view any threat to that decision as an attack upon 
abortion rights.7 Yet, unlike other foundational modern Supreme Court decisions, 
such as Brown v. Board of Education,8 the Court’s abortion decisions have failed to 
create consensus in society or settle the underlying issue.9 Hence, as a matter of 
persuasion and rhetoric, rather than power, the Court’s abortion decisions have 
failed. Upon examination, the reasons for this failure become apparent. Roe v. Wade 
and the Court’s subsequent abortion rights decisions lack foundation in reason, in 
the literal sense of failing to provide reasons for the Court’s central abortion holdings. 
The Court has been eloquent in justifying its own authority to create binding rules 
on abortion for the entire nation, but at key analytical points has provided little in 
the way of justification for those rules. 
A. Roe v. Wade 
Prior to Roe v. Wade, state legislation and enforcement were the primary 
determinants of abortion law and policy in the United States.10 Advocating actively 
in that realm, the abortion rights movement had substantial, but incomplete, success 
particularly in the decade prior to Roe v. Wade.11 Thus, in 1900, almost all states 
prohibited abortion throughout pregnancy, with the only exception being for the 
life of the mother.12 On the eve of Roe v. Wade, only about thirty states, including 
 
5. See WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID ( Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005); Jack M. Balkin, 
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007); Michele Goodwin & Meigan 
Thompson, In the Shadow of the Court: Strategic Federalism and Reproductive Rights, 18 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 333 (2017); Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 
64 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (2013); Reva Siegal, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
6. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
7. See, e.g., About Us, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/WUB9-PGU3] ( last visited July 10, 2018); Roe v. Wade,  
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/abortion/roe-v-wade 
[https://perma.cc/3RXE-NTSB] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
8. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade, An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE 
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 5, at 3. 
10. Joseph Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality and Law, 40 
 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 407 (1979). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 406; Harvey M. Adelstein, Note, The Abortion Law, 12 W. RESERVE L. REV. 74, 75 
(1960); Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 309 (1994); Zad Leavy & Jerome M. Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding 
Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (1962); Jone Johnson Lewis, Abortion History: The Controversy 
in the U.S., THOUGHTCO. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of-abortion-3528243 
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Texas, retained this strict form of abortion prohibition.13 Four jurisdictions had 
created elective abortion statutes, legalizing abortion to various points in the second 
trimester.14 A significant group of about thirteen states had enacted legislation 
similar to the Model Penal Code (MPC),15 providing for fairly broad categories of 
permissible abortions through an expansion of the concept of therapeutic 
abortion.16 
Roe v. Wade invalidated the abortion laws of all states and the District of 
Columbia, including the recently enacted statutes of the elective abortion 
jurisdictions.17 Roe replaced localized democratic governance of abortion with 
nationalized judicial governance, at least as to the core issue of legalizing elective 
abortion until viability.18 Further, the Court’s legalization of elective abortion 
through viability, which in 1973 meant through two-thirds of pregnancy, was in the 
global context a rather extreme settlement of the issue at the time, extending elective 
abortion beyond that of most European states.19 
Commentators and Justices have noted the lack of support for Roe in the text, 
history, or structure of the Constitution.20 For example, Justice White noted in 
dissent: 
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support 
the Court’s judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new 
constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or 
authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to 
override most existing state abortion statutes . . . . As an exercise of raw 
judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; 




13. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About 
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011). 
14. David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: A Historical Perspective, 62 
 ALB. L. REV. 833 (1999). 
15. MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
16. Jon F. Merz et al., A Review of Abortion Policy: Legality, Medicaid Funding, and Parental 
Involvement, 1967-1994, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 4 (1995). 
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973); see also Merz et al., supra note 16, at 5; Rachael  
K. Pirner & Laurie B. Williams, Roe to Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 166, 171–
72 (1993). 
18. Id. 
19. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); Julia  
L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women’s Reproductive Rights: A 
Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6. U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 759 (2004); see also Abortion 
Legislation in Europe, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/abortion-legislation/
europe.php#comparative [https://perma.cc/W4HA-7DLG] (last updated Sept. 15, 2016). 
20. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Modesty and Abortion, 59 S.C. L. REV. 701 (2008); Clarke 
D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned 
to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85 (2005); Paul Benjamin Linton & Kevin J. Todd, The Framers 
Did Not Incorporate a Right to Abortion, 81 ILL. B.J. 31 (1993); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 17 
(1993). 
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of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this 
Court.21 
In Roe, the long historical passages perhaps obscured for some the Court’s 
creation of something quite new in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the pretense of 
Roe v. Wade as a historically grounded, originalist decision never was very persuasive 
to most people on either side of the issue. Thus, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,22 the 
Court was ready to concede that Roe was based on an evolving interpretative method 
not bounded by historical understandings.23 Thus, the Court conceded that Roe 
“was, of course, an extension” of prior substantive due process precedents which 
themselves had gone through a period of development.24 Indeed, the Court 
specified that its interpretations of substantive due process were not historically 
bounded and thus were continually open to new extensions not bounded by the 
original intention.25 Hence, the Court ultimately rested the authority of Roe on the 
Court’s own “reasoned judgment,”26 which was not bounded by text, history, 
tradition, or precedent.27 
This reliance on the Court’s own “reasoned judgment,” unbounded by 
traditional sources of interpretation, would seem to require that the Court provide 
clear justifications and reasons for its specific holdings.28 This is particularly true 
since the Court admitted that abortion was a matter that required not just 
acknowledgment of the woman’s right but also a weighing of that right against other 
interests, including especially the State’s interest in protecting “prenatal life.”29 Thus, 
the core dilemma in Roe is how to balance or weigh the competing rights or interests 
of the pregnant woman and the human embryo or fetus. This dilemma is what 
separates the abortion issue from many other sexuality issues, as indeed the Court 
conceded in Roe itself.30 
Roe failed to provide “reasons” for its weighing of the respective rights and 
interests. This difficulty begins with the section of Roe that holds that the unborn, 
even at nine months gestation, are not constitutional persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31 The Court decided this issue solely on originalist grounds.32 Amidst 
the many pages of Roe and all of the Court’s subsequent abortion decisions, 
however, there is not one word of explanation or justification for the Court using 
an originalist method of interpretation in evaluating the constitutional rights of the 
 
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 221–22. 
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
23. Id. at 854. 
24. Id. at 853. 




29. Id. at 853. 
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
31. Id. at 158. 
32. Id. at 156–59. For a contrasting analysis of the personhood question from an originalist 
perspective, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO STATE L. J. 14 (2012). 
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unborn, while using a far more generous, evolving method of constitutional 
interpretation when evaluating the claim of abortion rights.33 Obviously the Court 
is stacking the deck by using a rather generous interpretative method to evaluate 
one set of rights claims while using another, much stricter interpretative method to 
evaluate the competing set of rights claims. The choice is even more peculiar when 
one considers the immense changes in medical and scientific knowledge about 
prenatal life, which would seem to provide an excellent basis for evolving 
constitutional understanding of the rights of the unborn. Certainly, medical and 
scientific knowledge of human procreation and prenatal life was rudimentary in 
1787 and 1868 as compared to 1973.34 However, the Court, in Roe and ever since 
Roe, has evaluated rights and interests pertaining to the unborn without ever 
discussing the biological facts of embryonic and fetal development. Similarly, the 
Court has failed to discuss developments in medical knowledge about the fetus or 
how what we know now is different than what was thought at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
This claimed reliance on originalist analysis and precedent as to the rights of 
the unborn allows the Court to frame abortion as a clash between the rights of the 
woman and state interests in prenatal life, rather than as the clash of rights between 
persons. Further, the Court makes this essential analytic move without a single word 
of true explanation, as though its holding is dictated by history and precedent––
which of course it is not, since in Roe the Court was bound by neither history nor 
precedent as to the woman’s right. 
The Roe Court’s encounter with the unborn in the guise of a medical and 
scientific reality occupies only a few lines of Roe. Here, the Court famously admits: 
“The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, 
later, a fetus, if one accepts the definitions of the developing young in the human 
uterus.”35 
The Court then issues another famous pronouncement: 
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins 
at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the 
State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after 
conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. 
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, 
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this 
 
33. Roe, 410 U.S. at 179. 
34. See Salim Al-Gailani & Angela Davis, Introduction to “Transforming Pregnancy Since 1900,” 
47 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 229 (2014); Karen Wellner, A History 
of Embryology (1959), by Joseph Needham, EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA ( June 28, 2010),  
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/history-embryology-1959-joseph-needham [https://perma.cc/ 
Q2LG-6ZCV]; Women, Power, and Reproductive Healthcare, OHSU, http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/ 
education/library/about/collections/historical-collections-archives/exhibits/women-power-and-
reproductive.cfm [https://perma.cc/8PCV-ZZNQ] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
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point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to 
speculate as to the answer.36 
The Court’s statement is unscientific. There is no reasonable scientific debate 
as to whether an embryo or fetus at risk of being surgically aborted is an individual 
human life. The embryo and fetus are genetically distinct from the pregnant woman; 
approximately half are a different gender from the mother.37 Clearly the embryo and 
fetus are not merely a part of the woman’s body. Embryonic and fetal life from a 
strictly scientific perspective are merely stages in the development and life of the 
human organism: as are, of course, infancy, childhood, and adolescence.38 Hence, a 
standard Embryology textbook states: 
Human development is a continuous process that begins when an 
ovum from a female is fertilized by a sperm from a male . . . . Most 
developmental changes occur during the embryonic and the fetal periods, 
but important changes also occur during the other periods of development: 
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood . . . Although it is customary to 
divide development into prenatal and postnatal periods, it is important to 
realize that birth is merely a dramatic event during development resulting 
in a distinct change in environment.39 
The post-Roe development of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), 
including especially in vitro fertilization (IVF), has raised new bioethical issues and 
caused some to consider a different status for the pre-implantation embryo.40 While 
the very early embryo is still a genetically distinct living human organism, the 
capacity for twinning and the high wastage rate, along with the medical practice of 
ART, has contributed to inconsistent use of the terminology of “pre-embryo” for 
the pre-implantation embryo, although the term does not seem to have become 
predominant.41 In addition, since Roe, pregnancy has been redefined in many 
official medical contexts as occurring at implantation rather than at fertilization, 
although apparently many physicians still prefer the conception or fertilization 
definition.42 In any event, the period between fertilization and implantation is not 
relevant to the question of surgical abortion that was before the Court in Roe. 
 
36. Id. 
37. Steven N. Austad, The Human Prenatal Sex Ratio: A Major Surprise, 112 PNAS 4839 
(2015); Steven Orzack et al., The Human Sex Ratio from Conception to Birth, PNAS, Mar. 30, 2015, at 
E2102. 
38. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, BRIGHT FUTURES: GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH 
SUPERVISION OF INFANTS, CHILDREN, AND ADOLESCENTS ( Joseph F. Hagan, Jr., et al. eds., 4th  
ed. 2017); KEITH MOORE ET AL., THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTATED 
EMBRYOLOGY (10th ed. 2015). 
39. See KEITH L. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY-ORIENTATED 
EMBRYOLOGY (3d ed. 1982). Moore’s text is now in the Tenth Edition. See infra note 39. The first 
edition was published in 1973, the year Roe was decided. 
40. See, e.g., GREGORY E. PENCE, MEDICAL ETHICS 96–139 (6th ed. 2011). 
41. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992) (quoting the American Fertility Society). 
42. See Kerry Grens, When Does Pregnancy Begin? Doctors Disagree, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2011, 
11:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-when-does-pregnancy-begin/when-does-pregnancy-
begin-doctors-disagree-idUSTRE7AG24B20111117 [https://perma.cc/FZ8V-YP7V]. 
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Certainly, by the time that a pregnancy can be established and surgical abortion is 
an option, there is no medical issue as to whether the human organism is biologically 
alive, human, and distinct—genetically or otherwise—from the pregnant woman. 
Of course if the embryo or fetus is dead, an abortion, as understood in the 
law, would no longer be possible, since removal of a dead fetus is by definition not 
an abortion.43 Indeed, a dead fetus is generally an indication for medical 
intervention.44 By contrast, the physician’s alleged failure to appropriately intervene 
to preserve the life and health of the fetus during pregnancy or labor, leading to 
neonatal death or the birth of an infant with health impairments, is a common cause 
of medical malpractice claims.45 It is here that the Court casts doubt on what are 
medical and scientific certainties that courts and the medical field otherwise in 
practice treat as settled facts. Certainly an obstetrician who could not tell the 
difference between a dead or live fetus would not be fit to practice. The Court 
completely confuses a philosophical, theological, or legal debate on the status and 
characterization of human prenatal life, often termed the debate on 
“personhood,”46 with the established medical and scientific facts about the embryo 
and fetus as stages of human development.47 
This distinction between the “personhood” debate and the scientific facts of 
human development is illustrated by the debate over the status of the neonate and 
infant.48 Certainly some people, both in modern times and also in the past, have 
regarded early infancy as a stage prior to the attainment of “personhood,” and some 
have used this exclusion from personhood to justify or minimize the harm of 
infanticide.49 However, that does not change the scientific certainty that infants are 
 
43. See Abortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1983) (defining abortion as the “knowing 
destruction of the life of an unborn child or the intentional expulsion or removal of an unborn child 
from the womb other than . . . removing a dead fetus”). 
44. HARVEY J. KLIMAN, INTRAUTERINE FETAL DEATH (2004),  https://medicine.yale.edu/ 
obgyn/kliman/placenta/research/Fetal%20Death%20UpToDate%202Feb04_196028_284_18220_v
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6K7-WWDZ]. 
45. See J.I.B. Adinma, Litigations and the Obstetrician in Clinical Practice, 6 ANN. MED. HEALTH 
SCI. RES. 74 (2016); Robert J. Stiller, 4 Ways to Lower Your Risk of an Obstetric Malpractice Suit, 
MODERNMEDICINE NETWORK (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.contemporaryobgyn.net/health-law-
policy/4-ways-lower-your-risk-obstetric-malpractice-suit [https://perma.cc/JW5B-LDZ6]. 
46. See, e.g., PENCE, supra note 40, at 82–84, 152; Mary Midgley, Persons and Non-Persons, in IN 
DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 52 (Peter Singer ed., 1985); Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status 
of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43 (1973), reprinted in THOMAS A. MAPPES & DAVID DEGRAZIA, BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 456 (4th ed. 1973). 
47. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 38. 
48. See, e.g., PENCE, supra note 40, at 152; SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL 
ETHICS 270 (George Weisz ed., 1990) (discussing the status of personhood conferred on neonates). 
49. See LARRY W. HURTADO, DESTROYER OF THE GODS, EARLY CHRISTIAN 
DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE ROMAN WORLD 144–48 (2016) (discussing Roman practice of infant 
exposure); JAMES Z. LEE & WANG FENG, ONE QUARTER OF HUMANITY: MALTHUSIAN 
MYTHOLOGY AND CHINESE REALITIES, 1700 – 2000, at 61 (1999); PENCE, supra note 40, at 152; 
MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983); Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, 
After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 261 (2012); William Saletan, After-
Birth Abortion, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/
human_nature/2012/03/after_birth_abortion_the_pro_choice_case_for_infanticide_.html 
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live human organisms, nor does it allow us to accurately refer to the neonate as 
“potential life”––as the Supreme Court wrongfully refers to the fetus.50 An anti-
abortion state legislator was recently ridiculed and criticized for not realizing that 
removal of a dead fetus is not an abortion, leading to discussions of the difficult 
experience of carrying a dead fetus whose heart is not beating and who is no longer 
moving––although the legislator corrected her error within a day.51 The obvious 
question is why the Supreme Court is not similarly ridiculed for not realizing that 
the fetus subject to an abortion is clearly and by medical and legal definition alive—
a mistake the Court has failed to correct over many decades. 
Some might argue that the Court’s confusion is an insignificant mistake in 
terminology rather than substance. There clearly is a debatable question of 
“personhood,”52 and some within that debate could label the fetus as a “potential 
person,” and hence the fact that the Court uses the wrong terminology and speaks 
about uncertainty over when “life begins” and refers to “potential life” is arguably 
insignificant. To the contrary, however, this error matters. It matters that the Court 
obscures and negates the scientific fact that the fetus is an individual human life, 
for it allows the Court, in confronting the legal issues, to avoid responsibility for the 
creation of legal rules that strip personhood and state protection from organisms 
that are clearly individual human lives. The refusal to acknowledge the scientific 
certainties about the embryo and fetus also lead the Court to never, in hundreds of 
pages of opinions on abortion, review the scientific literature on embryonic and 
fetal development. One would think that our nation’s definitive opinions about the 
legal status of prenatal life would include a careful review of the medical facts. There 
are many points of developmental significance in prenatal human development that 
could be discussed. What about the significance of the embryonic development of 
the primitive streak at day fifteen? What is the significance of the medical change 
in terminology from embryo to fetus at eight weeks of development? When does 
the heart start to beat? What is the course of development of the brain and nervous 
system? When does fetal hearing begin? What are the characteristic activities of the 




50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (stating that “the fetus, at most, represents only 
the potentiality of life”); Hutton Brown et al., Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, 
and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 693, 703 (1986). 
51. See Danielle Campoamor, I Carried My Dead Baby to Term & This Is What Anti-Choice 
Lawmakers Will Never Understand, ROMPER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.romper.com/p/ 
i-carried-my-dead-baby-to-term-this-is-what-anti-choice-lawmakers-will-never-understand-48720 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180608171729/https://www.romper.com/p/i-carried-my-dead-
baby-to-term-this-is-what-anti-choice-lawmakers-will-never-understand-48720]; Lucy Westcott,  




52. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
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maternal-fetal interaction, and even bonding? Both Roe v. Wade and subsequent 
decisions show a remarkable lack of engagement with the scientific and medical 
facts of embryonic and fetal life, which suggests that the nation’s rules for abortion 
can be fairly debated and determined without discussing such matters. As 
Professor/Judge Noonan summarized well, “[t]he Court’s opinion appeared to rest 
on the assumption that the biological reality could be subordinated or ignored by 
the sovereign speaking through the Court.”53 
The Court’s denial of the scientific facts, and refusal to discuss or analyze the 
medical facts about prenatal life, set the stage for debating abortion on an 
unscientific basis. The Court’s confusions will become the Nation’s confusion. 
Uncertainty about the social construct of “personhood” is not the same as the 
Court’s claimed uncertainty about “life,” and that difference matters—analytically, 
practically, and rhetorically. This is a category confusion with consequences, 
particularly when made and continued by the United States Supreme Court in the 
opinions that mandate for the nation the legal rules governing abortion. Given the 
prestige of science and medicine, it matters that the Court refuses to acknowledge 
the medical and scientific certainties related to the fetus. 
Further, the Court’s claim of agnosticism on when “human life begins” clashes 
with the Court’s decisions that the unborn throughout pregnancy are not 
constitutional persons, and that the State’s interests in fetal life do not become 
“compelling” until viability.54 Judicial uncertainty about “when life begins”55 could 
rationally lead to providing protection as a precautionary matter, for if there is a 
reasonable risk that previable fetuses are human life, one might want to protect 
against what otherwise could be millions of deaths. Alternatively, judicial 
uncertainty about the status of the unborn could lead the Court to defer to 
democratic actors. Instead, the Court defied the medical and scientific certainties 
about prenatal life and issued a definitive opinion that mostly stripped the unborn 
of legal protections, at least in the context of abortion.56 Indeed, the Court implicitly 
criticized Texas for “adopting one theory of life,” as though there were any other 
reasonable scientific or medical views of embryonic and fetal life.57 The scientific 
facts relating to the embryonic and fetal stages of human life indeed are not a theory 
but a matter of reasonable scientific certainty, as is the medical distinction between 
a dead and living fetus.58 Similarly, the Court denigrated these scientific certainties 
regarding embryonic and fetal life by referring to the State’s interest as “protecting 
the potentiality of human life,”59 or “potential life,”60 as though a human fetus 
 
53. John Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 673 (1984). 
54. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56. 
55. Id. at 152, 159. 
56. Id. at 158. 
57. Id. at 162. 
58. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 38; MOORE ET AL., supra note 38; see also supra 
text accompanying note 38. 
59. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
60. Id. at 163. 
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merely has the “potential” for life. Indeed, one can search in vain through many 
medical textbooks without finding a single one that states that a human fetus is only 
“potentially alive,” which would be just as nonsensical a statement as to assert that 
a human neonate or adolescent was only “potentially alive.”61 
As to the viability line, the Court’s only explanation is contained in three brief 
sentences: 
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in 
potential life, the ‘compelling point’ is at viability. This is so because the 
fetus then presumably has the capacity of meaningful life outside the 
mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus 
has both logical and biological justification.62 
As has been long-noted,63 this “seems to mistake a definition for a 
syllogism.”64 All the Court has done is restate the definition of viability, without 
providing a word of explanation as to why viability is the line. The statement’s 
reference to “biological justification” is also a clear misuse of science, for a previable 
fetus is not “biologically” less a living human organism than a viable human 
organism, particularly since “viability” is not a condition of the fetus but rather of 
the relationship between the fetus and changing medical technology.65 Thus, as the 
Court will later discover, but was already anticipated at the time of Roe, as medical 
technology improves, the definition of viability changes without any corresponding 
change in the fetus as a biological organism, creating the odd situation that the legal 
status of the fetus changes due to factors completely extrinsic to the fetus.66 
Obviously, arguments could be constructed as to why being profoundly 
dependent on another, as in the form found in human pregnancy, makes one less 
worthy of protection. The Court, however, never bothers to make that argument. 
From a pro-life perspective, the opposite would be true, for it is particularly the 
responsibility of the State to protect those who are most vulnerable, dependent, and 
unable to protect themselves.67 Certainly the weak and dependent are not less 
worthy of protection. In any event, debating the Court on viability is useless, for the 
Court is not a part of the conversation, having never explained, in Roe or since, why 
viability is a satisfactory dividing point for when the State’s interest in prenatal life 
 
61. I will discuss below whether the Court implicitly left this determination of the status of the 
unborn with each pregnant woman. 
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
63. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973). 
64. Id. at 924. 
65. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); City of 
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Ely, supra 
note 63. 
66. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Akron, 462 U.S. 416. This problem was noted at the time of Roe. See 
Ely, supra note 63. 
67. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 3 Responsibilities Every Government Has Towards Its Citizens, 
WORLD ECON. F. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/government-
responsibility-to-citizens-anne-marie-slaughter/ [https://perma.cc/6MJK-FYK9]. 
First to Printer_Smolin (Do Not Delete) 9/10/2018  10:26 AM 
684 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:673 
can outweigh the woman’s abortion liberty. The Court may be using its “reasoned 
judgment,” but if so, it is not willing to give publicly accessible arguments and 
reasons. 
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
The Court’s failure to provide publicly accessible reasons for its resolution of 
the abortion issue continued in the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.68 In Casey, the Court responded to the legitimacy critique of Roe with an 
explicit embrace of an evolving constitution not limited by the text, history, or 
structure of the document, and with the doctrine of stare decisis.69 Both of these 
approaches were about the Court and its power, rather than about the abortion issue 
itself. In neither case did the Court truly defend, substantively, the balance it had 
struck between abortion rights and the rights of (or state interests in) prenatal life. 
In Casey, the Joint Opinion of Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter at 
every point represents a majority of Justices and hence speaks for the Court. To the 
degree the Joint Opinion reaffirmed Roe, or invalidated abortion restrictions, the 
opinion is supported by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, and hence is the opinion 
of the Court.70 To the degree the Joint Opinion overruled Roe’s trimester 
framework, applied an undue burden standard to limit the application of strict 
scrutiny, and upheld statutory restrictions on abortion, the holdings are implicitly 
supported by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, White and Thomas. 
Indeed, this group of four Justices would have gone much farther than the Joint 
Opinion by overruling Roe v. Wade’s holding that abortion is a fundamental right, 
and thereby would have allowed states to prohibit previability abortions, 
presumably with exceptions for life of the mother and likely other specified 
circumstances.71 
The Joint Opinion’s explicit embrace of evolving constitutionalism, and 
rejection of historically-bounded originalism, was eloquent, even poetic, in arguing 
for evolving constitutionalism as a basis for a fundamental abortion liberty.72 While 
the Joint Opinion’s discourse on women and abortion was distorted from a pro-life 
perspective, which will be addressed below, what is most striking is the Joint 
Opinion’s continuing failure to apply evolving constitutionalism to the rights of the 
 
68. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The three-Justice Joint Opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in all of 
its parts constitutes the binding rules and precedent of the case, under standard rules of constitutional 
construction. 
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46. For a fuller critique of the Court’s stare decisis discussion, see 
Linton, supra note 20. 
70. Casey, 505 U.S. at 912, 922; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 846–47 (4th 
ed. 2011); Stephen G. Gilles, Why the Right to Elective Abortion Fails Casey’s Own Interest-Balancing 
Methodology—And Why It Matters, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 696 n.26 (2015). 
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 847–48; Gilles, supra note 70, at 696 
n.26. 
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–53. 
First to Printer_Smolin (Do Not Delete) 9/10/2018  10:26 AM 
2018] ABORTING REASON AND EQUALITY 685 
unborn.73 Thus, the Joint Opinion justified the abortion liberty in terms of the 
“right to define one’s own concept of existence,”74 but ignored the unborn child’s 
very right to exist. From a pro-life perspective, the Joint Opinion pondering the 
“mystery of human life”75 is an odd juxtaposition to an abortion right often 
effectuated by tearing apart the living body of a fetus.76 For the fetus, perhaps the 
Joint Opinion could have reflected instead on the mystery of death? The Joint 
Opinion is tone-deaf; its intentionally-elevated rhetoric on the abortion right 
demonstrates that it never truly considers the impact of abortion on the unborn 
child. 
The Joint Opinion repeated Roe’s failure to explain its one-sided application of 
evolving constitutionalism only to the abortion right, and not to prenatal life. Hence, 
while there are many pages justifying evolving constitutionalism and its application 
to the abortion liberty, there is not a single word on the possibility of applying this 
vaunted evolving constitutionalism to prenatal life. If evolving constitutionalism is 
the correct method of constitutional interpretation, why not apply it fully to the 
abortion issue, including to the rights of the unborn? Indeed, prenatal life is barely 
mentioned, occupying only a few lines.77 As a quantitative matter, there are six and 
one-half pages devoted to justifying the abortion liberty,78 comprising well over 200 
lines of text, and perhaps five lines of text analyzing the opposing consideration of 
prenatal life.79 On a quantitative basis, the abortion liberty gets perhaps 98% of the 
Joint Opinion’s attention, that of prenatal life perhaps 2%, and the possibility of 
unborn life having constitutional rights, 0%. 
The Joint Opinion followed Roe’s line of reducing discussion of prenatal life 
to a very brief mention of the “State interest” involved,80 as though abortion is 
simply a matter of personal liberty versus the oppressive hand of the law, rather 
than a potential conflict of one human being’s liberty against another human being’s 
right to exist. The Joint Opinion whitewashed the death of the unborn under the 
antiseptic language of “terminating a pregnancy,”81 thus allowing itself and the 
reader to pass quickly over the obvious point that when a “pregnancy is terminated” 
a life is also ended. Certainly, there is nothing in the Joint Opinion to give the 
impression that the Court was considering, even for a moment, the possible 
application of evolving constitutionalism to the rights of the unborn. The unborn 
are the hidden ghosts, the elephant in the room, the skeleton in the Court’s closet, 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 851. 
75. Id. 
76. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925 (2000) (describing “the potential need for 
instrumental disarticulation or dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facilitate 
evacuation from the uterus”); see generally WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE (1990). 
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53. 
78. Id. at 846–53. 
79. Id. at 852–53. 
80. Id. at 853. 
81. Id. at 850, 853. 
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the virtually unmentionable. It is as though the Court wants to justify its abortion 
decisions while giving only a glancing consideration of what abortion is and does. 
This is hardly a giving of “reasons.” 
Among its brief mentions of prenatal life, the Joint Opinion does speak of 
consequences “depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is 
aborted.”82 This language of “beliefs” and “potential life” repeats Roe’s fundamental 
confusion about the science of prenatal life.83 While the philosophical and legal 
“personhood” of the fetus is debatable, the fetus is every much as “alive” as anyone 
reading this page, and the status of the individual fetus as dead or alive is 
ascertainable as a medical fact.84 The Court again confuses philosophical and 
religious debate over “personhood” which is a matter of “belief,” with the scientific 
certainties. This confusion matters, for it allows the Court to pretend that whether 
abortion takes a human life is a matter of “belief” rather than scientific fact.85 
The Joint Opinion’s failure to consider rights and interests related to prenatal 
life, however, is not merely implicit. The Joint Opinion explicitly and specifically 
refused to defend the balance dictated in Roe between the abortion liberty and the 
life of the unborn.86 The Joint Opinion stated that the balance “was a subject of 
debate both in Roe itself and in decisions following it,” and that “the reservations 
any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the 
explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare 
decisis.”87 Thus, the Joint Opinion declined to even assert that the balance struck in 
Roe was correct, apart from stare decisis, let alone defend it with reasons. 
The Joint Opinion’s long discussion of stare decisis repeated this specific 
refusal to substantively defend Roe’s respective weighing of the abortion liberty and 
prenatal life. Hence, the Court stated: 
On the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the 
protection of potential life. The Roe Court recognized the State’s 
‘important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human 
life.’. . . . The weight to be given this state interest, not the strength of the 
woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe. We do not need 
to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the 
valuation of the state interests came before it as an original matter, would 
have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify 
a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain 
exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming 
as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe’s wake we are satisfied 
 
82. Id. at 852. 
83. Id. 
84. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 38; MOORE ET AL., supra note 38; MOORE, supra 
note 39; see also supra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
85. See sources cited supra note 84. 
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–53; Gilles, supra note 70, at 692–95, 717–20. 
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. 
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that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe’s resolution of the 
issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding.88 
One point must be emphasized: the Joint Opinion determined that the 
“soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue” was not relevant to their decision.89 
Hence, the Casey Court substantively refused to even attempt to defend the core of 
Roe, its resolution of the conflict between the abortion liberty, and prenatal life. 
Further, even as the Court refused to defend Roe, the Court repeated Roe’s flawed 
and unscientific language of “the potentiality of human life.”90 
The Court’s approach to justifying its abortion holdings is like a shell game 
where the justifications are always to be found somewhere else and remain ever 
hidden. Despite the length of the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, the Court failed to 
provide reasons for the most important parts of its decision, including the viability 
line, and its failure to consider the rights of the unborn in the light of evolving 
constitutionalism and new developments in scientific knowledge about prenatal life. 
Indeed, the known scientific facts about embryonic and fetal development are never 
mentioned in Roe, and thus are treated as irrelevant. Casey repeats these same failures 
as to viability and the rights and status of the unborn by essentially passing over 
these issues without cogent explanation. Casey goes further, however, by explicitly 
refusing to examine, let alone defend, the correctness of Roe as a matter of 
constitutional law and interpretation. Casey hence looks back to Roe to justify 
holdings that Roe itself never actually justified, in terms of providing reasons. Since 
Roe and Casey are the primary, and really only, moments in the Court’s many 
abortion cases and numerous decisions, when it either creates or reevaluates its core 
abortion holdings, the result is that the Court has never provided reasons for the 
balance it has struck between the abortion liberty and prenatal life. It is not merely 
that the Court’s reasoning is weak, but rather that the Court fails and refuses to 
provide reasons at all. Hence, Roe and Casey are acts of power lacking in reason. The 
Court’s opinions are about the Court’s power, and it is that power, rather than the 
Court’s substantive abortion holdings, that the Court defends. 
The Casey Court’s long discussion of stare decisis continues this emphasis, in 
the Court’s abortion decisions, on justifying the Court’s power rather than the 
Court’s decisions. The Joint Opinion refuses to say whether Roe is right, but argues 
that reaffirming even an erroneous decision on a highly contentious issue is better 
for the nation than overruling it in the midst of public controversy.91 The Joint 
Opinion thus argues that democratic activism against a decision of the Supreme 
Court is a reason for the Court to reaffirm that decision regardless of its correctness 
as a matter of constitutional interpretation.92 Instead of showing respect for public 
 
88. Id. at 871. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 864–69. 
92. Id. 
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and democratic activism on an issue of public concern, the Court treats such 
activism as an affront to the Court and even to the rule of law. 
The Joint Opinion seems obsessed with opposition to Roe, noting it 
repeatedly.93 Indeed, the Court is obsessed with its own inability to stop that 
opposition, characterizing Roe as a case where the Court “calls the contending sides 
of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common 
mandate rooted in the Constitution.”94 Yet the Court is frustrated by the fact that 
[abortions’] “divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the 
decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown only more intense.”95 
Here, the Court gets its history entirely wrong. However controversial 
abortion was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its grip on the national consciousness 
was minor compared to the major issues of the day, including the Vietnam War, 
and racial, economic, and environmental issues.96 Abortion itself was only one part 
of a broader subset of the larger issues related to the sexual revolution and the 
women’s movement, and from the vantage point of that time not the most 
important.97 Religious groups like the Southern Baptist Convention that would later 
become bastions of a strict anti-abortion position were trying to position themselves 
as presenting a compromise position regarding what they viewed as “difficult 
decisions about abortion.”98 Indeed, some argue that Southern Baptists generally 
were “pro-choice” at the time of Roe.99 Views on abortion were typically not a high 
priority in evaluating candidates for the Supreme Court. Democratic candidate 
George McGovern was lambasted by anti-abortion Democrats as the candidate of 
“acid, amnesty and abortion,”100 even though he viewed abortion as an issue best 
 
93. Id. at 853, 860, 861, 867, 869. 
94. Id. at 867. 
95. Id. at 869. 
96. See Jennifer Rosenberg, Vietnam, Watergate, Iran and the 1970s, THOUGHTCO. (May  
7, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/1970s-timeline-1779954 [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180608172554/https://www.thoughtco.com/1970s-timeline-1779954]; The Sixties: Moments  
in Time, PBS SOCAL, http://www.pbs.org/opb/thesixties/timeline/timeline_text.html 
[https://perma.cc/R83F-DEV3] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
97. See JEFFREY ESCOFFIER, GLBTQ, THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION, 1960-1980 (2004),  
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/sexual_revolution_S.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXV4-K8C8]; The 
1960s-70s American Feminist Movement: Breaking Down Barriers for Women, TAVAANA,  
https://tavaana.org/en/content/1960s-70s-american-feminist-movement-breaking-down-barriers-
women [https://perma.cc/FP92-YKEK] (last visited July 10, 2018) (“The feminist movement of the 
1960s and ‘70s originally focused on dismantling workplace inequality, such as denial of access to better 
jobs and salary inequality, via anti-discrimination laws.”). 
98. Southern Baptist Convention Resolutions on Abortion, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE (Nov. 7, 2010), 
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/baptist/sbcabres.html [https://perma.cc/Q9VQ-LEVU]. 
99. See Joshua Holland, When Southern Baptists Were Pro-Choice, MOYERS ( July  
17, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/07/17/when-southern-baptists-were-pro-choice/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180608173756/http://billmoyers.com/2014/07/17/when-
southern-baptists-were-pro-choice/]; Resolutions Search, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION,  http://www.sbc.net/ 
resolutions/year/1971 (Resolutions Search “1971”). 
100. See Timothy Noah, “Acid, Amnesty, and Abortion”: The Unlikely Source of a Legendary 
Smear, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 21, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/108977/acid-amnesty- 
and-abortion-unlikely-source-legendary-smear [https://web.archive.org/web/20140813035636/ 
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left to the states, while Richard Nixon positioned himself as personally pro-life but 
instructed the federal government to defer to the States, even when the States 
legalized abortion.101 States were coming to diverse conclusions as they engaged the 
issue legislatively and democratically, and the overall trend of the law was toward 
“liberalization of abortion statutes,” as noted in Roe.102 Abortion had not yet settled 
fully into the left v. right, Democratic v. Republican, identity politics of our day, and 
hence there was room for fluidity on the issue in the culture. The truth is that Roe, 
rather than helping end a national division on abortion, radically increased divisions 
on abortion, and helped nationalize what had been primarily a state law issue.103 
It is surprising that the Joint Opinion would have such a distorted historical 
understanding of Roe, when the contrary historical understanding has been well 
described by one of the Court’s strongest advocates of abortion rights, Justice 
Ginsburg. Hence, Justice Ginsburg famously opined that: 
Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The sweep and detail of 
the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an 
attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures. In place of the trend 
“toward liberalization of abortion statutes” noted in Roe, legislatures 
adopted measures aimed at minimizing the impact of the 1973 
rulings . . . .104 
The Court’s distorted historical understanding is matched by the Court’s 
distorted understanding of its relationship to the people, country, and Constitution. 
From the Court’s point of view, to admit error in Roe, “if error there was,” would 
undermine the very legitimacy of the country.105 The Court’s first premise in this 
strange argument is that correcting error would undermine the Court’s legitimacy, 
while refusing to overrule an erroneous ruling on a major constitutional issue would 
uphold the Court’s legitimacy.106 The Court’s second premise is that reconsidering 
and overruling a controversial decision amidst continued opposition would 
undermine legitimacy, rather than be seen as a sign of appropriate 
reconsideration.107 The Court’s third premise is that an undermining of the Court’s 




smear]; Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Richard Nixon: Statement About Policy on Abortions at 
Military Base Hospitals in the United States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Apr. 3, 1971),  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2963 [https://perma.cc/4KNK-BP3N]. 
101. Peters & Woolley, supra note 100. 
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1973). 
103. Id. 
104. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe 
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (footnote number omitted). 
105. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). 
106. Id. at 866–68. 
107. Id. 
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the self-confidence of the American people.108 Hence, the belief of the people in 
themselves as: 
[A] Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of  
law . . . . is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court 
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak 
before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court’s legitimacy 
should be undermined, then, so would the country . . . . The Court’s 
concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake 
of the Nation to which it is responsible.109 
Thus, reversing an erroneous decision and correcting it would undermine the rule 
of law and the very legitimacy of the nation.110 
The Court’s rhetoric is that of any sovereign who claims they must cling to 
power and not admit a mistake “for the sake of the people” rather than themselves, 
and is just as believable. There are echoes here of Sophocles’ King Creon, who 
refused to reconsider his cruel decree lest it show weakness and bring the law and 
state into disrepute, producing anarchy.111 One would hope the Justices do not 
believe their own rhetoric, but suspects that their self-delusion does rise to that level. 
Somehow, the Justices persuaded themselves that for the Court to overrule Roe, 
even if Roe was wrongly decided, would undermine the very legitimacy of the nation. 
The Court’s rhetoric turns to the bizarre when it portrays Americans as being 
“tested by following” the Supreme Court.112 These brave patriots who “follow” the 
Supreme Court do so by bravely refusing to “force” the “reversal” of the Court’s 
decisions.113 Of course there is no way to actually “force” the reversal of a Supreme 
Court decision, but the language is a clue as to the Court’s distorted thinking. 
Another clue is the Court’s implicit comparison of opposition to Brown I114 to 
opposition to Roe.115 After Brown I & Brown II,116 governmental officials flagrantly 
refused to implement the Court’s desegregation ruling for nearly a generation.117 
Fifteen years after Brown, the vast majority of African-American children in the 
South were still attending fully segregated schools, and in some states not a single 
African-American child was attending a publicly integrated school.118 The 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 868. 
110. Id. 
111. See Sophocles, Antigone, in CLASSICAL TRAGEDY GREEK & ROMAN 253, 266–80 (Robert 
W. Corrigan ed., Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1990). 
112. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868. 
113. Id. at 867. 
114. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. 
116. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
117. See Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand”: The Aftermath, LIBR. CONGRESS,  
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-aftermath.html#obj182 [https://perma.cc/PB2C-TPNR] 
(last visited July 10, 2018). 
118. Walter Goodman, Brown v. Board of Education: Uneven Results 30 Years Later,  
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/17/us/brown-v-board-of-education-
uneven-results-30-years-later.html?pagewanted=all. 
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opposition to Brown occurred through government officials directly disobeying the 
Court’s decision.119 As to abortion, however, there is nothing comparable. Roe 
instantly and successfully legalized elective abortion throughout the United 
States.120 The Court’s order was obeyed by government officials everywhere.121 
There have been tens of millions of legal abortions performed in the United States 
since Roe v. Wade.122 The Casey Court has fundamentally confused the normal and 
appropriate uses of democratic channels and freedom of speech with disobeying a 
court order and precedent. 
For the Court to consider that it has a right to command the people to accept a 
constitutional decision, in the sense of giving up all efforts to use democratic and 
lawful channels to overrule and limit it, is a profound misunderstanding of Marbury 
v. Madison123 and of the role of the Court in a democracy. The Court cannot 
command the minds of the people as to the meaning of the Constitution for we are 
not a totalitarian society. The Court has a constitutional obligation to be able to 
perceive the difference between legitimate and longstanding disagreement with the 
Court’s precedents, and disobedience of a precedent. Without such a distinction 
democracy falls and the principle of judicial review is pushed to the breaking point. 
At the point at which the Court perceives lawful and democratic opposition to its 
decisions as a reason not to reconsider or overrule even an erroneous decision, the 
Court has moved far beyond its mandate. The Court has moved from being the 
servant of the Constitution and the people, to attempting to make the people the 
servant of the Court. 
The Court’s explicit statements demonstrate clearly that it did not truly 
reconsider the correctness of Roe in Casey, but instead relied on a distorted 
understanding of stare decisis to avoid truly reconsidering the decision on its 
constitutional merits. Roe and Casey are acts of raw judicial power, but they do not 
provide reasons for the most important rules the Court imposes on the country. 
Indeed, Roe and Casey adapt the old adage of “my country right or wrong” to “my 
Court right or wrong.” For those who still seek to use reason to discern what is 
“right” about the Constitution and abortion, neither Roe nor Casey can supply 
answers. 
Indeed, the most obvious reading of Casey is that the majority viewed Roe to 
be substantively incorrect, as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Four Justices 
 
119. Brown at 60: The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP  
LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/brown-at-60-southern-manifesto-and-massive-resistance-brown 
[https://perma.cc/UJ22-FENR] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
120. See Sarah Kliff, CHARTS: How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion Rights, WASH. POST,  
Jan. 22, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/22/charts-how-roe-v-
wade-changed-abortion-rights/?utm_term=.abea8781401b. 
121. See id. 
122. Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions: Abortion Rates Since 
Roe v. Wade, 42 J. POL. 372 (1980). 
123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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directly stated that Roe should be overruled.124 As one of them, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, noted, the Joint Opinion “cannot bring itself to say that Roe was correct 
as an original matter . . . .”125 Presumably, if all three Justices of the Joint Opinion 
believed Roe was correctly decided, they would have said so, and not felt the need 
to hide behind stare decisis. The Joint Opinion rather coyly states that “[w]e do not 
need to say whether each of us . . . would have concluded, as the Roe Court did,” 
that bans on abortion prior to viability, even when “subject to certain exceptions” 
are unconstitutional.126 Why include such a sentence if it does not signal the 
substantive constitutional views of at least one of the authors? Hence, the logical 
conclusion is that somewhere between five and seven Justices believed Roe was 
incorrect “as an original matter,” with only two Justices, including the author of Roe, 
willing to assert Roe’s substantive correctness.127 Upon examination, then, Casey is 
an exercise in reaffirming a prior decision that the majority most probably believe 
to be, as an original matter, erroneous; the ultimate basis of that reaffirmation is not 
that the decision is correct but rather that the Court must defend its institutional 
integrity and reputation by not admitting its mistakes. 
II. WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY 
The conventional narrative views abortion rights as fundamental to women’s 
rights and gender equality. This narrative is so well-known that it needs little 
elaboration. The abortion liberty is seen as fundamental to women’s autonomy in 
allowing them control over their lives, bodies, sexuality, and reproductive functions. 
This autonomy is perceived as necessary to allow women to compete equally with 
men in the spheres of employment, education, politics, and civic life, and to free 
women from patriarchal control. Given the burdens of stereotyped gender 
expectations related to maternity and pregnancy, women’s equality requires the 
abortion liberty.128 
Upon examination, the abortion rights movement is based on presuppositions 
that imply the inferiority of women. The abortion rights movement distrusts women 
profoundly, both individually and as a group. Further, the abortion liberty in the 
context of contemporary American society may hurt women more than it helps 
 
124. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992). 
125. Id. at 953. 
126. Id. at 871. 
127. See Gilles, supra note 70, at 717–20. 
128. See, e.g., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 5; Ginsburg, supra note 
104; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53–59 (1977); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical 
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Katha 
Pollitt, Can a Feminist Be Pro-Life?, NATION (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/can-
a-feminist-be-pro-life/ [https://perma.cc/P4JB-TNZX]. For further citations, see Erika Bachiochi, 
Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. &  
PUB. POL’Y 889, 891 n.3 (2011). 
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them, as it is based on a misunderstanding of the primary obstacles to equality and 
flourishing for women in contemporary America.129 
A. Roe and Women’s Rights 
It is generally recognized that Roe v. Wade was not written as a women’s rights 
or gender equality opinion.130 Indeed, the Court’s summary statement focused on 
how the Court’s holdings vindicate the physician’s, rather than the woman’s, control 
over abortion: 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer 
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points 
where important state interests provide compelling justifications for 
intervention. Up to those points the abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it 
must rest with the physician.131 
Indeed, the Court strangely states as well, in summary of its rule creating 
elective abortion until viability: “This means, on the other hand, that, for the period 
of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in 
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, 
that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”132 
The Court’s language seems strangely backwards, as it sounds literally as 
though the abortion decision belongs to the physician in consultation with the 
woman, rather than belonging to the woman in consultation with her doctor. The 
reference that the pregnancy “should be terminated” in the doctor’s “medical 
judgment”133 is very strange in a context where the vast majority of abortions will 
not have any medical need or indication.134 
Justice Ginsburg aptly commented that in Roe, “the view you get is the tall 
doctor and the little woman who needs him.”135 Professor Petchesky, another 
feminist abortion rights advocate and the sole author cited by the Casey Joint 
 
129. See, e.g., Bachiochi, supra note 128; Sidney Callahan, Abortion & the Sexual Agenda, in 62 
REFERENCE SHELF 34, 44 ( Janet Podell ed., 1990); Erika Bachiochi, A Putative Right in Search of a 
Constitutional Justification: Understanding Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s Equality Rationale and How it 
Undermines Women’s Equality, 35 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 593 (2017). 
130. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 844; Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 382–83. 
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66. 
132. Id. at 163. 
133. Id. 
134. GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED  
STATES (2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_induced_abortion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GEH3-WMTU]; Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110 (2005). 
135. Robert Barnes, The Forgotten History of Justice Ginsburg’s Criticism of Roe v. Wade,  
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the- 
forgotten-history-of-justice-ginsburgs-criticism-of-roe-v-wade/2016/03/01/9ba0ea2e-dfe8-11e5-9c36- 
e1902f6b6571_story.html?utm_term=.689c643c6def. 
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Opinion in regard to gender equality and abortion,136 is in accord: “Of course the 
actual formulation of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton did not stress the woman’s right 
or capacity to choose so much as the physician’s; they were decisions that relied on 
and bolstered medical authority.”137 
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Roe Court’s reference to “the right 
of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional 
judgment”138 is clearly erroneous. Since the Court’s rejection of economic 
substantive due process rights in 1937, there has been no such thing as a 
fundamental right to practice a profession, job, or vocation at all, let alone a 
fundamental right to practice in a manner contrary to the dictates of governmental 
regulation.139 The one exception would be in the context of the Comity Clause, but 
the Clause is only relevant if there is discrimination as to state or local residence.140 
Physicians are only permitted to bring challenges to abortion statutes by virtue of 
third-party standing, which allows the physician to rely on the woman’s abortion 
right, since the physician has no right of his or her own to assert.141 Justice 
Blackmun is thus clearly in error to summarize his decision as vindicating physician 
rights to practice medicine free of governmental control, for such right does not 
exist.142 
Nonetheless, this error indicates that Justice Ginsburg and Professor 
Petchesky are correct about Roe and physicians: in the mind of the author, Justice 
Blackmun, and apparently the entire Court, the opinion is really about the freedom 
of doctors rather than the freedom of women. This is also underscored by the one 
regulation of abortion which the Roe opinion explicitly permits in the first trimester, 
which is the requirement that abortions be performed only by physicians.143 Hence, 
Roe frees women from the control of the State as to abortion, only to hand her over 
to what was in 1973 an overwhelmingly male-dominated medical profession.144 
 
136. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing ROSALIND  
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143. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. 
144. See ANN K. BOULIS & JERRY A. JACOBS, THE CHANGING FACE OF MEDICINE: WOMEN 
DOCTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (2008); Eliza L. Chin, Historical 
Perspective, in THIS SIDE OF DOCTORING: REFLECTIONS FROM WOMEN IN MEDICINE 1 (Eliza  
L. Chin ed., 2002); Aaron Young et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the United States, 
101 J. MED. REG. 8 (2014). 
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Justice Ginsburg’s statement that the Roe Court envisions “the little woman” 
who needs the “tall doctor” further suggests that Roe itself is based on a demeaning 
view of women.145 Rhetorically and practically, it seems that the Roe Court did not 
really trust women with the abortion right, and hence felt the need to place women 
under the control of a male-dominated medical profession.146 While a charitable 
view of the Roe Court would state that the Court placed women in the hands of the 
medical profession to protect the safety of women, given the Court’s erroneous 
rhetoric about physician’s rights, this charitable view is not a complete explanation. 
How do you explain the Court preferring to summarize the abortion right in terms 
of a nonexistent physician’s right, rather than in terms of the women’s right the 
Court had just established? In addition, the Roe Court stressed the safety of abortion, 
stating that it was much safer in the first trimester than continuing the pregnancy 
and proceeding to childbirth.147 If abortion is so safe, could it not perhaps be 
performed by other competent medical personnel, besides doctors, and hence made 
more accessible? Roe rhetorically and practically subjects women to the control of 
physicians’ judgment, even as to nonmedical aspects of the abortion decision, 
suggesting that more than safety is at issue in the Court’s focus on physicians’ rights 
and lack of focus on women’s rights. 
B. Casey and Equality 
The Court in Casey would have certainly been well aware of the critique of Roe 
as insufficiently attentive to gender equality concerns, particularly given that the 
critique had been publicly voiced by a member of the Court.148 While the Court did 
not attempt to supplement the Roe Court’s substantive due process analysis with 
formal analysis under the equal protection clause, the Joint Opinion did discuss 
equality in the section on stare decisis.149 There, in discussing the reliance interest 
of Roe as a precedent, the Joint Opinion stated: “The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives.”150 
Abortion rights proponents seem not to have noticed the problematic nature 
of such a claim, and in particular how its presuppositions imply the inferiority of 
women. First, one needs to ask: why do women need abortion to be “equal” to 
men? The obvious answer is that men don’t get pregnant, and therefore an abortion 
is the closest a woman can come to being like a man. Abortion liberty allows a 
woman seemingly to escape what a man automatically escapes, the risk of becoming 
pregnant, through the liberty to end that pregnancy at will. But isn’t basing women’s 
equality on needing to be like—or as nearly like as possible––a man, itself a 
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discriminatory premise?151 Are abortion rights advocates, including the Court in 
Casey, not implicitly admitting that they believe male sexuality and being male is 
superior to female sexuality and being female? Rex Harrison famously sang, in a 
classic presentation of sexism: “Why can’t a woman be more like a man?”152 It seems 
that the abortion rights movement is singing off the same song sheet.153 
It is interesting how few struggle, in American culture, with the inability of 
men to become pregnant and bear children, and how that might mark men as 
inferior or disadvantaged. By contrast, the concern that women’s capacity to 
become pregnant might disadvantage women is foundational to abortion rights 
literature and rhetoric.154 It would seem that this foundational prejudice and sexism 
in our culture has been absorbed as a presupposition by the abortion rights 
movement.155 Hence, pro-life feminist Sidney Callahan notes: 
While Margaret Mead stressed the ‘womb envy’ of males in other 
societies, it has been more or less repressed in our own. In our male-
dominated world, what men don’t do, doesn’t count. Pregnancy, 
childbirth, and nursing have been characterized as passive, debilitating, 
animal-like. The disease model of pregnancy and birth has been 
entrenched. This female disease or impairment, with its attendant “female 
troubles,” naturally handicaps women in the ‘real’ world of hunting, war, 
and the corporate fast track. Many . . . cite the ‘basic injustice that women 
have to bear the babies,’ instead of seeing the injustice in the fact that men 
cannot . . . ; unfortunately, many women have fallen for the phallic 
fallacy.156 
Practically speaking, moreover, the abortion liberty does nothing to help 
women compete with men, unless women are willing to use it by actually 
undergoing abortions. Women have to pay a price to be “nearly like” a man: they 
have to choose and undergo an abortion. Men, of course, do not have to pay such 
a price to avoid pregnancy. Hence, if women need abortion to be equal to men, they 
will never be equal, because they have to pay a higher price for this equality than the 
man: actually choosing and undergoing abortion. 
A part of this higher price that women must pay for equality is, in significant 
part, the willingness to choose an act which many, perhaps most, women view as 
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causing the death of her offspring.157 Here is where the abortion rights movement 
runs into one of its fundamental problems: women who have various degrees of 
anti-abortion views. 
If such women were rare, the problem would be difficult enough. However, 
to the contrary, polling over several decades has shown little gender gap on 
abortion. For example, “Gallup’s abortion polling since the mid-1970s finds few 
remarkable distinctions between men’s and women’s views on the legality of 
abortion.”158 The polling by Pew similarly reveals “[n]o gender gap in views on 
whether abortion should be legal.”159 Interestingly, polling in the U.K. finds women 
to be more anti-abortion than men.160 Behind this polling on the legality of abortion, 
moreover, it appears that a majority of Americans believe that life either begins at 
conception or by implantation, and hence by implication would believe that all 
surgical abortions and most pharmaceutical abortions would end a human life.161 
Abortion polling is notoriously subject to how the questions are worded, 
leading both sides able to manipulate the questions and to some degree the 
results.162 However, it is fairly clear that among both women and men there are 
minorities who truly exemplify either the pro-life orthodoxy of prohibiting all 
abortions (except those necessary to save the life of the mother), or the abortion 
rights orthodoxy of supporting elective abortion through viability or later, as well as 
supporting late term abortion methods such as intact D & X abortion (also known 
as partial birth abortion). Most women and men are somewhere in the middle, with 
their views of abortion dependent on the stage of pregnancy and the circumstances 
of the woman.163 Most Americans when asked support Roe, but at the same time a 
large majority of both women and men say they would support prohibiting abortion 
after the first trimester, a position inconsistent with Roe.164 Polling varies on whether 
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the pro-life or pro-choice label are more popular, but significant pluralities of 
Americans of similar proportions embrace both labels.165 For example, in 2016 
Gallup reports 47% of Americans identifying as pro-choice and 46% identifying as 
pro-life.166 Since far more Americans embrace such labels than actually hold pure 
pro-life or pure pro-choice viewpoints, the decision to accept such labels seems as 
much a matter of identity as one’s actual position on abortion. Hence, there is a 
surprising degree of overlap in views on a number of specific abortion issues among 
those who accept the purportedly conflicting pro-life and pro-choice labels.167 
The abortion rights mantra embraced by the Supreme Court in Casey—that 
women need abortion rights to compete with men in American society—is 
particularly problematic for the more than 40% of American women who identify 
as pro-life.168 The message for pro-life women is that they must choose between 
their conscience and equality. From this perspective, “equality” logically requires 
pro-life women to violate their consciences and choose to abort an embryo or fetus 
whom the woman regards as her unborn daughter or son. After all, if abortion is 
what allows women to compete with men, the possibility of being able to abort does 
no good unless one is willing to follow through and actually undergo an abortion 
when a pregnancy occurs at the “wrong” time of life. 
Indeed, abortion practitioners regularly perform abortions on women who 
perceive abortion to be wrong, and even murder, at the time of the abortion.169 The 
abortion rights movement explicitly or implicitly labels such women hypocrites, and 
sometimes evidences a certain degree of contempt for them.170 Indeed, the 
movement seems to assume that such women are representative generally of pro-
life women, as though some degree of inconsistency or hypocrisy was the unique 
preserve of pro-life women.171 
However, perhaps the deeper problem is that the success of the abortion rights 
movement has created a situation where some pro-life women have embraced the 
sexist presumption that a woman must choose between her equality and future life 
on one hand, and her conscience and the life of her unborn child on the other hand. 
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This set of presumptions puts pro-life women in a box under which they lose 
regardless of which choice they make. 
Pro-life feminist Sidney Callahan put the matter quite well decades ago: 
Pitting women against their own offspring is not only morally 
offensive, it is psychologically and politically destructive. Women will never 
climb to equality and social empowerment over mounds of dead 
fetuses . . . . As long as most women choose to bear children, they stand to 
gain from the same constellation of attitudes and institutions that will also 
protect the fetus in the woman’s womb—-and they stand to lose from the 
cultural assumptions that support permissive abortion. Despite temporary 
conflicts of interest, feminine and fetal liberation are ultimately one and 
the same.172 
C. The Abortion Liberty, Equality, and Personal Life 
Beyond the issue of whether abortion rights help women attain equality and 
success in regard to employment and careers, is the issue of how it impacts their 
personal lives. Here, abortion rights feminist Petchesky, writing more than fifteen 
years after Roe, expressed frustration with young women: 
Even during the most liberal years of teenage access to abortion and 
contraception, the potentially liberating impact of that access was muffled 
by the persistence of a male-dominant culture and social relations of sex. 
The openness and legitimacy of nonmarital heterosexual activity continued 
to be encumbered with traditional risks and pain for young teenage 
women, inasmuch as they played for different stakes (commitment, love, 
romance) than males, and often lost. A clear feminist vision, an alternative 
culture of sexuality embracing passion and play as well as love, has not 
penetrated the consciousness of younger generations . . . .173 
This is a very odd passage, and observes situations where young women have 
different sexual and relational goals than young men.174 Petchesky seems profoundly 
disappointed that these single young women, handed the liberations of abortion and 
contraception, still yearn for “commitment, love, [and] romance . . . .”175 Petchesky 
implicitly acknowledges that these liberations cannot help young women attain 
“commitment, love, romance,” and she wants young women to change their 
personal goals toward what might be termed a more liberated sexuality.176 
It is revealing to see a feminist from an earlier generation criticize a younger 
generation of women for wanting to attain stable, loving partnerships with men, as 
though that goal represented some basic deficiency. The abortion liberty appears to 
be a part of a broader agenda to redirect the personal sexual and reproductive goals 
and practices of women. Rather than helping women achieve their sexual, relational, 
 
172. Callahan, supra note 129, at 44. 
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and reproductive goals, the abortion liberty may be designed to alter those goals. 
The abortion liberty may be both the symptom and cause of an unraveling and 
reshaping of the intricate relationships between women and men, women and 
children, and men and children. That unraveling and reshaping may indeed make 
committed long-term partnerships between women and men less available in 
society, and thus can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This reshaping of women’s 
sexual and reproductive goals may be pursued in the name of furthering gender 
equality and women’s rights, and freeing women from patriarchal control. 
Nonetheless, the entire project appears misogynist, as it seeks to make women’s 
sexuality in effect more like men’s, in the sense of being unburdened by the 
possibility of pregnancy, and being modeled after the more unattractive forms of  
male sexual practice.177 
Thus, to the degree that the sexual and reproductive goals of young women 
are focused on commitment, love, and romance, in the form of long-term 
partnerships with men, the abortion liberty may hinder, and does not help, achieve 
such goals. The abortion liberty is hence about changing women’s sexuality, rather 
than meeting the sexual and reproductive goals of women. This point is further 
underscored by the next topic, that of “abandoning women to their privacy.” 
D. Abortion as a Privacy Right: Abandoning Women to Their Privacy 
Both abortion rights feminists and pro-life feminists have noted the 
difficulties created, for women, of defining the abortion right as a privacy right. 
Hence, Petchesky states: 
The claim for ‘abortion rights’ seeks access to a necessary service, but 
by itself it fails to address the social relations and sexual divisions around 
which responsibilities for pregnancy and children is assigned. In real-life 
struggles, this limitation exacts a price, for it lets men and society neatly off 
the hook.178 
Similarly, Callahan writes: 
Permissive abortion, granted in the name of women’s privacy and 
reproductive freedom, ratifies the view that pregnancies and children are a 
woman’s private individual responsibility. More and more frequently, we 
hear some version of this old rationalization: if she refuses to get rid of it, 
it’s her problem. A child becomes a product of the individual woman’s 
freely chosen investment, a form of private property resulting from her 
own cost-benefit calculation. The larger community is relieved of moral 
responsibility.179 
 
177. Callahan, supra note 129, at 46–51. To be clear, I am not asserting that all male sexual 
practices are unattractive, and am not implying that male sexuality is inherently aberrant; rather, I assert 
simply that some male sexual practices are unattractive or irresponsible. 
178. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 7. 
179. Callahan, supra note 129, at 45. 
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Thus, the woman’s “choice” becomes a social obligation to abort so as to not 
inconvenience others, with her capacity to demand co-responsibility with the father, 
her family, and society undermined. The woman who refuses to abort in the face of 
a complex or difficult situation can be abandoned to her privacy by those who no 
longer feel any responsibility for the pregnancy or the resulting birth of any children. 
Hence, the abortion right is turned against women and used by male sexual partners, 
family members, and society at large to justify their failure to take joint responsibility 
with the woman for pregnancy and childrearing. Petchesky sees this negative result 
as perhaps caused by the contexts in which the abortion liberty is exercised,180 while 
Callahan argues that the abortion liberty is itself partly responsible for undermining 
the woman’s social situation.181 
Either way, in the real-world situation in the United States, with its neo-liberal 
economic system and privatized concepts of family life, the abortion liberty’s 
promise of “choice” undermines many women’s capacity to insist on the conditions 
that could empower her to give birth, keep her baby, and thrive. As Callahan notes, 
the woman, instead of being empowered, faces “the debilitating reality of not 
bringing a baby into the world; not being able to count on a committed male partner; 
not accounting oneself strong enough, or the master of enough resources, to avoid 
killing the fetus.”182 
Hence, the Supreme Court’s doctrinal grounding of abortion in autonomy, 
privacy, and liberty may ultimately undermine woman’s equality, particularly in the 
context of American society. Ultimately, the realization of women’s equality, 
particularly in the spheres of sexuality, reproduction and family life, requires more 
than abandoning women to their “privacy,” but rather requires a context of co-
responsibility. The abortion liberty becomes a self-fulfilling defeat for many 
women: because many men, families, and communities are unreliable, women are 
granted the abortion liberty. However, the reality and rhetoric of an abortion liberty 
becomes an additional permission and validation of many men, families, and 
communities to continue to be unreliable.183 
Perhaps the abortion rights movement has miscalculated regarding the 
fundamental obstacles many women face in achieving practical equality and 
empowerment. The classic story of empowerment is liberation from overcontrol 
and oppression––for women the need to be liberated from patriarchal control. 
While problems of patriarchal control surely continue, perhaps the greater problem 
for many young women in contemporary America is not overcontrol but 
abandonment. The problem for many young women is not that fathers, boyfriends, 
or husbands are controlling their lives and sexual and reproductive functions, but 
rather that they lack stable families of origin or reliable and responsible life partners. 
Worse, abandonment, exploitation, and patriarchal control may co-exist as sexual 
 
180. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 7–8. 
181. Callahan, supra note 129, at 45; see also Bachiochi, supra note 128, at 919–24. 
182. Callahan, supra note 129, at 49. 
183. See id. 
First to Printer_Smolin (Do Not Delete) 9/10/2018  10:26 AM 
702 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:673 
“liberation” reinforces male entitlement and impunity. The abortion right in some 
contexts may facilitate forms of patriarchy that marry a purported ethic of sexual 
liberation with continuing exploitation of women’s bodies. True liberation in post-
sexual revolution America may require the creation of contexts in which co-
responsibility, mutual respect, and commitment can thrive. Otherwise, freedom in 
modern America may be, as Janis Joplin put it long ago, “just another word for 
nothing left to lose.”184 
E. Democracy and Women in Contemporary America 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which the abortion rights movement 
distrusts women as a group is the demand to remove abortion as much as possible 
from the democratic process. Roe v. Wade of course invalidated the democratically-
created laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.185 As noted above, this 
was done in the name of physician’s rights more than women’s rights, as a way of 
shielding medical practice from majoritarian control in regard to abortion.186 If one 
repudiates the physician’s rights rationale of abortion and tries to substitute the 
women’s rights rationale, however, the decision to remove abortion from the 
democratic sphere becomes problematic. Women, after all, comprise a majority of 
voters in contemporary America.187 Thus, if one truly trusted women as a group, it 
would seem natural to entrust the abortion decision to the democratic process. 
Thus, Erika Bachiochi notes: “It is particularly ironic that a women’s movement 
which began with the quest to ensure women political participation through the 
franchise would favor, generations later, removing the privilege and power of 
democratic participation from women through the Court’s sharp intervention in the 
abortion debate.”188 
Abortion rights proponents, however, must be painfully aware that even if 
only women were allowed to vote on abortion, the result would not reflect the 
positions of the abortion rights movement. As noted above, women’s views on 
abortion are not markedly different from that of men, and over 40% of American 
 
184. Janis Joplin, Me and Bobby McGee, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Janis-joplin-me-and-
bobby-mcgee-lyrics [https://perma.cc/9DW6-L47S] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
185. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973); see also Merz et al., supra note 16, at 5; Rachael  
K. Pirner & Laurie B. Williams, Roe to Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 166, 171–
72 (1993). 
186. See supra Section II.A. 
187. See CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VOTER  
TURNOUT ( 2017), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/genderdiff.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3723-4R87]; Catherine Rampell, Why Women Are Far More Likely to Vote 
than Men, WASH. POST, July 14, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/catherine- 
rampell-why-women-are-far-more-likely-to-vote-then-men/2014/07/17/b4658192-0de8-11e4-8c9a-
923ecc0c7d23_story.html?utm_term=.239d693606f9. 
188. Bachiochi, supra note 129, at 632 n.163; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Concurring in Roe, Dissenting 
in Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 5, at 152, 152 (arguing that laws 
enacted after women were granted the constitutional right to vote should be viewed differently than 
laws enacted when women were denied the right to vote). 
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women self-identify as pro-life.189 Hence, the decision to move the locus of control 
of abortion from the democratic process to the Supreme Court is a decision to 
distrust women as political actors. 
Distrusting women as political actors is reflective of the deeply problematic 
nature of a movement that purports to speak for women, and yet which advocates 
views that most women reject. The abortion rights movement, after all, defends late 
term abortions which the vast majority of women reject.190 The abortion movement 
defended an abortion movement, D & X abortion (partial birth abortion), which 
most women reject.191 The abortion movement opposes many regulations of 
abortion which most women support.192 Hence, the abortion rights movement 
seeks to maintain the locus of control over abortion policy in courts in part because 
it allows the movement to continue its illusion of speaking for American women, 
even as it profoundly distrusts the viewpoints of a majority of American women. 
F. Deciding Not to Abort in Contemporary America 
The riddle of anti-abortion women who abort has suited the abortion rights 
movement, for it offers an opportunity to respond to a significant problem: the lack 
of allegiance of women to the movement. It is, after all, awkward for a movement 
that purports to advocate for women to face the opposition of nearly half of women 
who self-identify as pro-life, and the ambivalence of many others who reject many 
forms of abortion which the abortion rights movement supports.193 The abortion 
rights movement has implicitly argued that if anti-abortion women anyway choose 
abortion, then anti-abortion women as a group can be dismissed, their views 
discarded without the necessity of reply. Of course, reasoning from anecdote in this 
fashion is hardly logical. It can hardly be surprising that a significant number of 
anti-abortion women abort, given the extreme pressures individuals experience to 
abort, often from family members and male partners, the tendency in American life 
and culture to abandon and isolate women in their “right to privacy,” the cultural 
expectation to abort as the purportedly best response to a crisis pregnancy, and the 
all too familiar human capacity to rationalize a seemingly “pragmatic” even if 
 
189. See supra notes 158–67 and accompanying text. 
190. See Abortion, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180710115053/http://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx] 
(last visited July 10, 2018) (finding that in 2007, 72% of those polled thought “late term” and “partial 
birth” abortions should be illegal); Poll: 80 Percent of Women Support Late-Term Abortion Bans, 
FEDERALIST ( Jan. 19, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/01/19/poll-80-percent-of-women-
support-late-term-abortion-bans/ [https://perma.cc/V2T9-LQL2]; Emily Swanson & Mark 
Blumenthal, Abortion Poll Finds Support for 20-Week Ban, HUFFINGTON POST ( July 11,  
2013, 7:25 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/11/abortion-poll_n_3575551.html 
[https://perma.cc/RR8T-S499]. 
191. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); 
Abortion, supra note 190 (finding that in 2007, 72% of those polled thought “late term” and “partial 
birth” abortions should be illegal). 
192. See supra notes 189–91 and sources cited therein. 
193. See supra notes 158–67, 190–91 and accompanying text. 
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unethical decision. Nonetheless, from some number of anti-abortion women who 
abort the abortion rights movement has tended to take the inference that pro-life 
beliefs make no little or difference at all in individual women’s abortion decisions.194 
For example, Petchesky states: 
The same woman who avers that abortion is “terrible” or “wrong” 
may also insist on her need or right to have one; at the very least, she will 
act on that belief, whatever her professed convictions. Escalation of the 
“right to life” propaganda campaign depicting abortion as murder and 
fetuses as innocent babies has apparently influenced how people feel and 
talk about abortion, but not what they choose to do about it.195 
This tendency to dismiss as irrelevant the views of the majority of women who 
either identify as pro-life, or who remain in the ambivalent middle on abortion, 
illustrates the profound disrespect of the abortion rights movement toward women. 
Since some anti-abortion women purportedly speak by their actions of undergoing 
abortions, the views and words of all anti-abortion women are disregarded. Anti-
abortion women are dismissed as hypocritical, inconsistent, and naïve, and 
influenced by anti-abortion “propaganda,” and rigid religious teaching.196 By such 
reasoning the abortion rights movement tends to dismiss as irrelevant women’s 
moral reasoning on abortion. 
This dismissal of women’s moral reasoning on abortion is reflected in the 
research articles of the Guttmacher Institute.197 The Guttmacher Institute certainly 
provides useful and significant research on a variety of reproductive issues, but from 
an explicitly abortion rights, rather than neutral, perspective.198 It seems fair to 
regard Guttmacher as simultaneously a useful research institute and also as a part 
of the abortion rights movement, given the organization’s explicit and consistent 
advocacy for reproductive rights including specifically the legal availability of 
abortion services.199 
In this context, it is fascinating that while Guttmacher states a purpose in 
“examining the factors underlying women’s decisions to terminate their 
pregnancies,”200 the Institute seems eager to dismiss the possibility that women’s 
moral choices on abortion could have anything to do with the dramatic decline in 
the numbers and rates of abortion in the United States.201 The decline is dramatic 
 
194. See, e.g., PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 369; infra notes 169-71, 197-203 and accompanying 
text. 
195. See PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 369. 
196. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 171; Arthur, supra note 169. 




200. Id. at 4. 
201. See Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the 
United States, 49 PERSP. ON SEXUAL REPROD. HEALTH 17 (2017) (suggesting that the decline in 
abortion rates was due to some combination of increased contraceptive use and decreased access to 
abortion services due to facility closure or newly implemented state policies); Joerg Dreweke, New 
First to Printer_Smolin (Do Not Delete) 9/10/2018  10:26 AM 
2018] ABORTING REASON AND EQUALITY 705 
as current abortion rates are the lowest ever recorded in the more than forty years 
since Roe, with the numbers of abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age cut 
by about 50% from the peak in this period.202 The details of the debate over the 
causes of these declines in abortion are beyond the scope of this paper. What is 
important here is that the Guttmacher-related publications either ignore entirely the 
very question of whether women’s moral reasoning on abortion might have an 
impact on the steeply declining numbers and rates of abortion, or else seek to 
debunk the possibility of women’s moral reasoning having an impact, perceiving 
the very concept as essentially anti-abortion propaganda.203 This eagerness to 
dismiss the possibility that women’s moral reasoning may play a role in abortion 
rates represents another aspect of the abortion rights movement’s disrespect toward 
women, and in particular toward the moral reasoning of women. 
The abortion rights movement’s dismissal of the moral reasoning of women 
regarding abortion is a part of the movement’s agenda of being pro-abortion rather 
than merely “pro-choice.” If the movement were truly neutral on the morality of 
abortion but simply trying to protect and empower women’s moral choices on 
abortion, the movement would welcome and seek evidence that women’s moral 
choices on abortion were consequential to the rate of abortions. Instead, the 
movement assumes that abortion is moral, and indeed is the best response to many 
or most unintended pregnancies.204 Abortion rights literature, such as the 
Guttmacher Institute’s reports and statements, portray abortion as an innately moral 
and helpful medical service furthering the agenda of reproductive health and rights, 
rather than a profoundly personal and difficult question of personal morality.205 
Thus, women who choose not to have abortions in circumstances of unintended 
pregnancies compounded by difficult life circumstances are seen as implicitly 
irresponsible, in the way that anyone who declines a useful and effective medical 
treatment could be seen as irresponsible.206 
Thus, even abortion rights advocate Petchesky notes: “For the liberal, it is not 
the woman who gets an abortion who is ‘selfish,’ but the one who doesn’t––when 
she is too young or too poor or too ‘incompetent.”207 Petchesky roots this “liberal-
 
Clarity for the U.S. Abortion Debate: A Steep Drop in Unintended Pregnancy Is Driving Recent Abortion 
Declines, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2016/03/new-clarity-
us-abortion-debate-steep-drop-unintended-pregnancy-driving-recent-abortion [https://perma.cc/ 
M7DP-RR6Y] (arguing instead that the decline in abortion rates was due to a decrease in unwanted 
pregnancies, most plausibly resulting from increased contraceptive use). 
202. Induced Abortions in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. ( Jan. 2018),  
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/7GMN-
EE8N]. 
203. See, e.g., Jones & Jerman, supra note 201; Dreweke, supra note 201. 
204. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 197; KATHA POLLITT, PRO: RECLAIMING 
ABORTION RIGHTS (2015). 
205. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 197. 
206. Cf. id.; PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 376. 
207. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 376. 
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utilitarian”208 perspective in a legacy of “eugenics” and “bourgeois morality” that 
“justifies abortion in the name of ‘quality over quantity’” and teaches that “‘maternal 
duty’ involved rational planning and budgeting, of children as well as household 
economies.”209 The rhetoric of the Guttmacher Institute falls into this “liberal-
utilitarian” camp, with its constant monitoring of unintended pregnancies and 
explicit endorsement of the view that “reducing the unintended pregnancy rate is a 
national public health goal.”210 From this perspective, abortion of unintended 
pregnancies itself becomes a kind of public health mandate, given Guttmacher’s 
view that “[b]irths resulting from unintended or closely spaced pregnancies are 
associated with adverse maternal and child health outcomes, such as delayed 
prenatal care, premature birth, and negative physical and mental health effects for 
children.”211 
From this pro-abortion (rather than simply pro-choice) perspective, the anti-
abortion and morally-ambivalent views of women are an obstacle to be overcome, 
in service of a “liberal-utilitarian” public health agenda. Hence, the dismissal of 
women’s moral reasoning regarding abortion is not an accident, but deeply woven 
into the structure and foundations of the current abortion rights movement. 
The theme of the anti-abortion women influenced by rigid religious teachings 
and anti-abortion propaganda is also common in abortion rights literature, 
sometimes with the implication that women are essentially victims of their own 
religious and moral beliefs.212 Again, a truly “pro-choice” movement would not 
need to constantly attack, belittle and bemoan the religious and moral anti-abortion 
views of women, but rather would respect the agency of women. 
This dismissal of the role of women’s anti-abortion viewpoints on the 
numbers of abortions is flawed. While some anti-abortion women choose to abort 
when faced with unintended pregnancies and difficult circumstances, many others 
choose to nonetheless give birth. Anecdotes exist in both directions, indicating that 
there must logically be some statistical significance to anti-abortion viewpoints.213 
 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 375. 
210. Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 2016),  
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states [https://perma.cc/ 
684H-C6B8]. 
211. See id. 
212. See PETCHESKY, supra note 136; Arthur, supra note 169; Arthur, supra note 171. 
213. Cf. PETCHESKY, supra note 136; Arthur, supra note 169; Arthur, supra note 171; Christina 
Doell, I Told Planned Parenthood I Was Keeping My Baby and They Said They Couldn’t Help, STUDENTS 
FOR LIFE (Feb. 10, 2017), http://studentsforlife.org/2017/02/10/i-told-planned-parenthood-i-was-
keeping-my-baby-and-they-said-they-couldnt-help/ [https://perma.cc/33H5-VMXA]; From Relief to 
Regret: Readers’ Experiences of Abortion, BBC ( Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
38775641 [https://perma.cc/7BX9-EUDH]; I Don’t Know if I Should Get an Abortion or Keep the 
Baby?, BABYCENTER (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.babycenter.com/400_i-dont-know-if-i-should-get- 
an-abortion-or-keep-the-baby_11087255_799.bc [https://web.archive.org/web/20180608195414/ 
https://www.babycenter.com/400_i-dont-know-if-i-should-get-an-abortion-or-keep-the-baby_ 
11087255_799.bc]; Raquel Kato, I’m That Girl - That Girl That Got Pregnant, FOCUS (Oct. 19, 2012), 
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Indeed, even according to Guttmacher Institute statistics, close to half of all 
pregnancies in the United States are unintended, with about 40% ending in abortion 
and about 60% ending in birth.214 Thus, the majority of unintended pregnancies are 
not aborted, despite Guttmacher’s essentially negative viewpoint of such 
pregnancies.215 
Deciding not to abort in contemporary America requires resistance to the 
“liberal-utilitarian” moral viewpoints portraying abortion as a moral duty. Hence, 
Petchesky notes that “[m]any subjects in abortion studies ‘want a child’ but say that 
abortion is the necessary and harder choice because of external circumstances.”216 
Many women face what Petchesky characterizes as oppressive conditions and harsh 
realities in which “parents are unsupportive or condemning, boyfriends angry or 
withdrawn, school peers taunting and stigmatizing . . . conditions in which the 
genuine desire for a child is thwarted by poverty, inadequate housing, lack of a 
supportive partner, or the unavailability of child care.”217 Indeed, women articulate 
not just that they want “a child” as Petchesky delicately puts it, but “the baby,”218 
indicating a consciousness that a non-fungible human being already exists, with 
abortion perceived as “still taking a life.”219 It is fascinating that Petchesky is at pains 
to argue that “the oppressiveness of the conditions does not negate the authenticity 
of the decision” to undergo an abortion,220 but has no interest in those similarly 
situated women who meet the “oppressiveness of the conditions” with a decision 
to not abort and give birth instead. The lack of interest in these women, and in the 
“authenticity” of their decisions, provides the clue that no matter how 
sympathetically women may appear to be listened to, it is through the lens of a pro-
abortion, rather than merely pro-choice, agenda. 
In addition, one might have thought that women’s rights advocates would 
express more concern with the apparently common situation of women who would 
prefer to continue a pregnancy and specifically want “the baby,” choosing to 
undergo an abortion due to oppressive situations. The additional aspect that many 
of these women believe that the abortion they are choosing is “taking a life” similarly 
does not appear to concern most abortion rights advocates, except insofar as they 
perceive the woman’s anti-abortion views as an obstacle to the woman’s liberation, 
or a reason to negate anti-abortion viewpoints. The abortion rights movement in 




214. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 134. 
215. See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, supra note 210. 
216. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 372. 
217. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 372–74 (Petchesky’s exact language is “harsh realities” and 
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218. Id. at 373 (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 77 (1982)). 
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women; the movement seems more interested in explaining away women’s views of 
prenatal life and abortion, than in respecting those views. 
III. RELIGION, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND ABORTION 
While obvious, it bears repeating that the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution explicitly protects religious freedom,221 while by contrast the 
abortion right was written into the Constitution by the Supreme Court in 1973.222 
It is a part of the hubris of evolving constitutionalism to think that a right viewed 
as fundamental from the origins of the Constitution, more than two hundred years 
ago, should consistently give way to a right created by the Court two generations 
ago. The hostility of so many today to religious liberty in the name of judicially-
created rights is a sign that evolving new rights is not cost-free, but comes with the 
risk and actuality of displacing those rights that were originally provided in the 
written Constitution. 
That being said, the point of this Article is that religious proponents of the 
pro-life perspective are not aberrant eccentrics seeking to harm women in the name 
of obscure and outmoded religious dogma. Rather, religious proponents, in general, 
are seeking to remind American law and culture of fundamental values deeply 
rooted and still prized in American culture. Religious pro-life proponents present 
publicly accessible reasons for their positions which are understandable in both 
secular and religious terms. In addition, religious proponents are not seeking to set 
aside settled science in favor of sacred scripture or long-held tradition, but rather 
are reminding the courts and society not to obscure or set aside the basic scientific 
facts of prenatal human life. Religious proponents of the pro-life position, many of 
whom are women, moreover are presenting a reasonable interpretation of what it 
would mean to respect women, as a group and individually, in the context of 
abortion––and of why abortion rights in fact are built upon a lack of respect for 
women, both as a group and individually. 
Further, religious and secular pro-life proponents are not trying to take society 
back to some idealized or demonized past stage, but are trying to remind society of 
what abortion means today, in the context of today’s scientific understandings and 
in the context of today’s issues related to gender relations, sexuality, and family life. 
Indeed, it seems that many abortion rights activists are still focused almost 
exclusively on past battles of freeing women from patriarchal control, while many 
younger women and men experience a world where abandonment and lack of 
commitment are also significant issues. The abortion liberty may facilitate forms of 
patriarchy that marry a purported ethic of sexual freedom with continuing 
exploitation of women’s bodies. 
Fundamentally, it is the abortion rights movement that is discriminatory: 
against the unborn and against religious persons and organizations. The abortion 
 
221. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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rights movement is also discriminatory against women in several senses. The 
movement is built upon a lack of respect for women as democratic actors, a lack of 
respect for the conscience and views of individual women, and attempts to build 
female equality on making women more like men. 
Thus, while certain laws or lawsuits may present the issue of a religious 
accommodation regarding abortion, such constellation of legal issues should not 
confuse the fundamental position of religion in American society as to the abortion 
issue. Pro-life religious beliefs are a call to inclusion of all human beings as deserving 
of recognition before the law as persons, an application of contemporary scientific 
understandings, and recognition of the deeply problematic dilemmas women face 
in relationship to abortion. 
Of course, this is an idealized portrayal of religious pro-life activism; however, 
while not always accurate, it is accurate enough to form a basis for recasting the 
relations of religion and abortion. Religious proponents must dare to come to the 
table regarding abortion as full participants unbowed by demands to present 
themselves as conscientious objectors to the values of American society. At their 
best, pro-life religious advocates represent broadly-held and deeply-rooted 
American values, and make a valid, if uncertain, case for representing the future of 
America. 
